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Is That Really Me?: Social Networking
and the Right of Publicity
ABSTRACT

Social networking websites are ubiquitous in modern culture
and popular with people of all ages and demographics. Operators of
this kind of site, which consist largely of thirdparty generated content,
are immune from many types of civil liability for third party postings
under the Communications Decency Act. However, the Act does not
immunize these providers from intellectual property right
infringements. Recent court decisions suggest that this immunity
exception may extend not only to federal intellectual property rights,
but state intellectual property rights like the right of publicity. This.
Note will evaluate the emerging circuit split regarding state
intellectualproperty liability for interactive computer service providers.
After determining that the existing statutory scheme does not immunize
these providers from state intellectual property liability, this Note will
examine the problematic implications of right of publicity liability for
social networking sites. This Note will then suggest two Congressional
responses to this problem. First, it will analyze the incentives created
by the various types of intellectual property rights to suggest that
Congress should explicitly immunize interactive computer service
providers from right of publicity liability in order to consistently
promote the Communications Decency Act's policy goals. Second,
Congress could establish a federal right of publicity in order to
minimize problems of interactive computer service providers trying to
comply with the law.
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Social networking sites are exploding in popularity and
changing the way people communicate. From April 2009 to February
2010, Facebook nearly doubled its membership from over two hundred
million to over four hundred million active users. 1 In 2008, Twitter
reported an annual growth rate of 752 percent, capping off the year
with a total of 4.43 million unique visitors in December. 2 In addition
to these two social networking giants, sites like MySpace, Match.com,
3
and eHarmony remain widely used around the world.
As Internet-enabled social networking has changed the way
people keep in touch with one another, it has also changed the way
people dispute with one another. Lawsuits related to activities
conducted on social networking sites are numerous; notably,
frustrated singles have sued online matchmaking services for
fraudulent promises, 4 companies have sued sites for issuing
usernames that infringe their trademarks, 5 and landlords have sued

1.
Facebook, Company Timeline, http://www.facebook.comlpress/info.php?statistics#!/
press/info.php?timeline (last visited Feb. 18, 2010).
2.
See Posting of Adam Ostrow (Twitter's Massive 2008: 752 Percent Growth) to
Mashable: The Social Media Guide, http://mashable.com/2009/01/09/twitter-growth-2008/ (Jan. 9,
2009, 15:43:55 EST).
3.
See
Alexa,
About
Myspace
(myspace.com):
Social
Networking
Site,
http://www.alexa.comlsiteinfo/myspace.com (last visited March 5, 2010) (giving Myspace traffic
data); Alexa, About Match.com (match.com): Personal ads with photos, anonymous email, advice
and date ideas, http://www.alexa.com/siteinfo/match.com (last visited March 5, 2010) (giving
Match.com traffic data); Alexa, eharmony, http://www.alexa.comlsiteinfo/eharmony.com (last
visited March 5, 2010) (giving eHarmony traffice data).
4.
See Thomas Zambito, Suit: 'Match' Sticks It to Hopeful Users, N.Y. DAILY NEWS,
June 10, 2009, at 3, availableat http://www.nydailynews.comny_localfbrooklyn/2009/06/10/200906-10_suitmatch sticks it tohopeful-users.html.
5.
See Associated Press, Oneok Drops Trademark Lawsuit Against Twitter, ABC NEWS,
Sept. 17, 2009, http://abcnews.go.com/Technology/wireStory?id=8599399.
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tenants for defamatory postings. 6 The communication forum created
by interactive Internet sites has connected people, but it has also
created a new arena of legal liability.
Not only has online social networking changed the way that
people communicate with others they actually know, but it has also
put them in closer touch with people they don't know, including
Far from being immune to the social networking
celebrities.
revolution, today's celebrities have their own Facebook profiles,
MySpace pages, or Twitter accounts where fans can follow their dayto-day routines. 7 Similarly, celebrities are not immune from the
litigation that has arisen surrounding these social networking sites.
The recent surge in Twitter popularity has led one celebrity, St. Louis
Cardinals' manager Tony LaRussa, to sue the site because a third
party was using his name to impersonate him on the site.8
Fortunately for the providers of these interactive sites,
Congress foresaw the increased liability risks interactive sites would
create and, in 1996, it passed the Communications Decency Act
(CDA), which contains provisions that minimize some of these
liabilities.9 Although the Supreme Court overturned much of this Act
as unconstitutionally vague, 10 key provisions granting interactive
computer service providers (ICSPs)11 immunity from civil suit were
See Ben Meyerson & Andrew Wang, A Landlord's Tweet Suit Has All Atwitter, CHI.
6.
TRIB., July 29, 2009, at C6, available at http://www.chicagotribune.comlnews/local/chi-twittersuit-29-ju129,0,2500898.story.
See Mike Kendrick & Lucas Wagner, How to Make the Social Net Work, GATEWAY,
7.
Sept. 17, 2009, available at http://www.thegatewayonline.ca/articles/features/2009/09/17/howmake-social-net-work.
Associated Press, Cardinals Manager LaRussa, Twitter Settle Lawsuit, USA TODAY,
8.
June 5, 2009, http://www.usatoday.com/sports/baseballlnl/cardinals/2009-06-05-larussa-twitterlawsuit_-N.htm; see also, e.g., Xan Brooks, Ewan McGregor Twitchy over Fake Twitter Site,
GUARDIAN, Mar. 9, 2009, http://www.guardian.co.uk/film/2009/mar/09/ewan-mcgregor-faketwitter-feed (describing celebrity victims of online imposters); Posting of Jennifer Peebles (Fake
Twitter Account for Traffic News has TxDOT in a Lather) to Texas Watchdog,
http://www.texaswatchdog.org/2009/09/fake-twitter-account-for-traffic-news-has-txdot-in-alather/ (Sept. 3, 2009, 23:27:14 CST) (describing litigation over fake Texas Department of
Transportation Twitter feed).
Communications Decency Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 133.
9.
See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
10.
11.
Id. § 509, 110 Stat. at 137-39 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2006)).
Notably, the service providers covered by the CDA include a wide variety of interactive web site
operators, and not just "Internet Service Providers" in the traditional sense. 47 U.S.C. § 230(0(2)
(defining "interactive computer service" for the purposes of the CDA as "any information service,
system, or access software provider that provides or enables computer access by multiple users to
a computer server, including specifically a service or system that provides access to the Internet
and such systems operated or services offered by libraries or educational institutions"); see
Universal Commc'n Sys., Inc. v. Lycos, Inc., 478 F.3d 413, 419 (1st Cir. 2007) (noting that
"[plroviding access to the Internet is ... not the only way to be an interactive computer service
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left intact. 12 This immunity has undoubtedly contributed to the
exponential growth of social networking on the Internet-because
ICSPs are insulated from legal claims related to third-party generated
content, they are willing to host forums where third parties can share
13
their ideas and connect with one another.
However, a key qualification to this immunity requires that
interactive online sites remain liable for "any law pertaining to
intellectual property."'14 In response, most ICSPs have developed
strategies that minimize intellectual property liability. 5 These coping
strategies seem to have been largely efficient-traditional intellectual
property liability has not prevented sites that permit content, photo,
or file sharing from flourishing. 16
Despite the ability of these sites to cope with federal
intellectual property law obligations, recent court decisions indicate a
new liability threat for sites that allow users to create profile
identities.' 7 These courts have suggested that ICSPs are liable not
only for federal intellectual property law claims, but also for state
intellectual property law claims, including those related to the right of
publicity.' 8 Exposure to claims for infringement of this right-which
protects each person's inherent right to control the commercial use of
his or her identity-would mean that, if third parties create accounts
and falsely claim to be other individuals, those individuals could sue
not only those posting the information but the commercial social
networking site as well. 19 Because this potential liability arises from
provider" under the CDA); Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d 1119, 1122-23 (9th Cir.
2003) (noting that immunity under the CDA extends to a wide variety of Internet service
providers).
12.
See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
13.
See Zeran v Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330-31 (4th Cir. 1997).
14.
47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(2) (2006).
15.
See discussion infra Part III.A.
16.
See The Utube Blog: An Unofficial Blog on YouTube + The File Sharing Industry,
Decoding the DMCA Safe Harbors, http://theutubeblog.com/2009/01/27/decoding-the-dmca-safeharbors/ (Jan. 27, 2009, 17:36).
17.
See, e.g., AtI. Recording Corp. v. Project Playlist, Inc., 603 F. Supp. 2d 690, 704
(S.D.N.Y. 2009); Doe v. Friendfinder Network, Inc., 540 F. Supp. 2d 288 (D.N.H. 2008).
18.
See Almeida v. Amazon.com, Inc., 456 F.3d 1316, 1323-24 (11th Cir. 2006) (assuming
state intellectual property claims are excepted from CDA immunity); Project Playlist, 603 F.
Supp. 2d at 704; Friendfinder,540 F. Supp. 2d at 302; Gucci Am., Inc. v. Hall & Assocs., 135 F.
Supp. 2d 409, 413 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (assuming state intellectual property claims are excepted from
CDA immunity).
19.
See Law Wire-Communicating the Law, New York District Court Rules That State
Common Law Copyright Claims Are Not Barred by the Communication Decency Act [United
States], http://law-wire.blogspot.com/2009/04/new-york-district-court-rules-that.html
(Apr. 6,
2009, 11:22 IST) ("This conclusion, if adopted by other courts, could give a boost to the viability of
a range of state law claims related to intellectual property-such as common law
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the basic service these sites provide (the creation of an online
identity), a change in liability law could have a profound effect on the
availability of such social networking sites.
This Note examines the current case law regarding the
applicability of CDA immunity to ICSPs for right of publicity claims,
analyzes the likely effects of liability on these service providers,
distinguishes the right of publicity from other types of intellectual
property rights, and then discusses potential legislative action to
mitigate the negative effects of liability on social networking sites.
Part I of this Note summarizes the history of the CDA and discusses
the development of the right of publicity. It then explains the
emerging circuit split regarding the applicability of this immunity to
state law intellectual property claims. Part II.A adopts and defends
the position that the CDA, as written, does not immunize ICSPs from
state intellectual property law claims. Part II.B analyzes the effects of
this liability on ICSPs and identifies the problems such liability could
create with regard to social networking sites. In response to these
problems, Part III.A analyzes how ICSPs could act to shield
themselves from liability for right of publicity claims. Alternatively,
Part III.B discusses potential congressional responses to ICSP
liability, by first exploring the incentives behind the right of publicity
to distinguish it from traditional intellectual property rights, and then
proposing that Congress statutorily immunize ICSPs from right of
publicity claims. In Part IV, the Note concludes by considering the
adoption of a uniform federal right of publicity statute to respond to
the problems created by non-uniform state right of publicity laws.
I. THE CDA AND THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY

A. Section 230 of The CDA
Congress passed the CDA in 1996.20 Through the CDA,
Congress sought to promote the free exchange of information and
ideas over the Internet and to encourage voluntary monitoring of the
Internet for offensive or obscene material. 21 In pursuing these goals,
Congress consciously tried to preserve the burgeoning Internet
"unfettered by Federal or State regulation," balancing the Internet's
value as a forum for the exchange of information and ideas against the
misappropriation, right of publicity, and state or common-law trademark law claims-brought
against the operators of various online services.").
Communications Decency Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 133.
20.
47 U.S.C. § 230(b) (2006); see Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d 1119, 1122
21.

(9th Cir. 2003) (citing Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1026-30 (9th Cir. 2003)).
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need to protect its users, particularly minors, from inappropriate
material. 22 Thus, instead of imposing specific government regulations
regarding Internet content, Congress chose to incentivize selfregulation of Internet content by ICSPs through the development of
23
content-screening technologies.
To accomplish these goals, § 230 of the CDA grants ICSPs
immunity from civil suits arising from third-party generated content
posted on the ICSP's site. 24 Although granting ICSPs immunity may
seem like a counterintuitive way to promote self-regulation, it
incentivizes self-regulation by eliminating the disincentives created by
the New York Supreme Court's 1995 decision in Stratton Oakmont,
Inc. v. Prodigy Services Co. 25 Prior to Stratton, ICSPs were treated as
distributors, not publishers, of third-party content posted to the
Internet. 26 Consequently, all ICSPs were held to a distributor's
liability standard, under which they were liable in civil suits arising
from third-party generated material only if they "knew or had reason
to know" that questionable content was posted. 27 However, Stratton
imposed the greater publisher's liability standard on ICSPs that
attempted to regulate their services, making ICSPs that monitored
third-party generated content liable in civil suits arising from that
material as if they had created the material themselves. 2
Consequently,
Stratton discouraged
ICSPs from voluntarily
monitoring material posted to the Internet, since abstaining from
monitoring was the only way ICSPs could limit their exposure to
liability for third-party generated content. 29 Because § 230 of the CDA
immunizes ICSPs from liability even if an ICSP chooses to monitor its
services, it eliminates Stratton's perverse incentives and creates a

22.
See Communications Decency Act of 1996 § 509, 110 Stat. at 137-39 (codified as
amended at 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2006)); S. REP. No. 104-23, at 59 (1995) (noting that Congress "has
been troubled by an increasing number of published reports of inappropriate uses of
telecommunications technologies to transmit pornography, engage children in inappropriate
adult contact, terrorize computer network users through 'electronic stalking' and seize personal
information").
23.
47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(4).
24.
Id. § 230(c).
25.
1995 WL 323710 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995); see Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129
F.3d 327, 331 (4th Cir. 1997) ("Congress enacted § 230 to remove the disincentives to selfregulation created by the Stratton Oakmont decision.").
26.
See Cubby, Inc. v. Compuserve Inc., 776 F. Supp. 135, 140 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
27.
Id. at 140-41.
28.
1995 WL 323710, at *3-*5 (imposing the publishers liability standards on an ICSP in
a defamation suit).
29.
See Zeran, 129 F.3d at 331.
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legal environment that promotes self-regulation of Internet content by
ICSPs. 30
In addition to eliminating the disincentive to self-regulate,
immunity from suit promotes the growth of the Internet by
encouraging ICSPs to provide forums in which third parties can
express and exchange ideas.3 1 If ICSPs were exposed to liability for
third-party content, it would discourage them from providing these
32
types of forums and perhaps even eliminate the forums altogether.
Therefore, insulating ICSPs from civil liability through § 230 of the
CDA "promote[s] the continued development of the Internet and other
33
interactive computer services."
Courts have generally construed § 230 immunity broadly by
classifying most web services as ICSPs. 34 The CDA distinguishes
between "providers of interactive computer service providers" and
"information content providers": the former are granted immunity
from civil liability by the Act, while the latter are not. 35 The difference
in the two groups is that content providers are responsible, in whole or
in part, for creating the information provided, whereas service
providers merely enable access by multiple users to a single server or
system.36 Thus, to offer broad immunity under the CDA, courts have
set a relatively high threshold for what constitutes "creating or
developing information," making it easier for Internet sites to be
categorized as mere service providers rather than as content
providers. 37 Ultimately, § 230 of the CDA offers broad protection for
services publishing online content provided primarily by third
38
parties.

30.

See id.

See id. at 330.
31.
32.
See id. at 331 ("Faced with potential liability for each message republished by their
services, interactive computer service providers might choose to severely restrict the number and
type of messages posted.").
33.
47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(1) (2006).
See Universal Commc'n Sys., Inc. v. Lycos, Inc., 478 F.3d 413, 419 (1st Cir. 2007)
34.
(reviewing cases from other circuits and stating that "we too find that Section 230 immunity
should be broadly construed"); Zeran, 129 F.3d at 331 (explaining that a broad reading of the
provision is necessary to avoid restrictive effects on free speech interests); see also sources cited
supra note 11 (discussing the CDA definition of ICSP).
35.
47 U.S.C. § 230(c), (f)(2)-(3).
36.
Id. § 230(0(2)-(3).
Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d 1119, 1122-23 (9th Cir. 2003); see 47
37.
U.S.C. § 230(f)(2)-(3) (distinguishing information content providers from interactive service
providers).
38.
Carafano,339 F.3d at 1123; see, e.g., Parker v. Google, Inc., 242 F. App'x 833 (3d Cir.
2007) (showing links to objectionable message boards not providing content); Universal, 478 F.3d
at 420 (operating a website while aware statements are defamatory not providing content);
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Despite courts' inclination to broadly interpret who qualifies as
a protected ICSP under the CDA, the scope of the immunity offered to
those entities is incomplete. 39 In fact, the CDA itself directly limits
ICSP immunity. 40 Most importantly for the purposes of this Note, the
immunity does not extend to "any law pertaining to intellectual
property. 4 1 Furthermore, the CDA does not "prevent any State from
enforcing any state law that is consistent with [the CDA]."42 Although
the Supreme Court overturned parts of the CDA as unconstitutionally
vague in Reno v. ACLU, it left § 230 of the CDA undisturbed, and it
43
remains good law today.
B. The Right of Publicity
The state-law right of publicity recognizes "the inherent right
of every human being to control the commercial use of his or her
identity."44 Although infringement cases typically involve celebrity
plaintiffs, the majority of courts agree that enforcement of this right is
not contingent upon celebrity status. 45 . Every person has the right to
control the commercial use of his or her identity and to recover
damages and the commercial value of any unauthorized taking of that
46
identity in court.
The right of publicity originated within the domain of privacy
law, focusing on the mental trauma suffered when one's identity was
disseminated through unauthorized commercial use.47 However, when
Carafano, 339 F.3d at 1124-25 (providing questionnaire to structure third-party responses not
providing content); Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1030-32 (9th Cir. 2003) (selecting e-mails for
publication with some editing not providing content); Ben Ezra, Weinstein, & Co. v. Am. Online
Inc., 206 F.3d 980, 985-86 (10th Cir. 2000) (communicating and occasionally correcting stock
information not providing content). But see Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v.
Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 1164-65 (9th Cir. 2008) (requiring answers to siteauthored questions that would elicit discriminatory responses makes site a provider of that
discriminatory content).
39.
See 47 U.S.C. § 230(e).

40.

See id.

41.
Id. § 230(e)(2).
42.
Id. § 230(e)(3).
43.
521 U.S. 844 (1997).
44.
1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY § 1:3 (2d ed. 2009)
[hereinafter MCCARTHY, PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY].
45.
William Sloan Coats & Jennifer P. Gossain, Right of Publicity: Who, What, When,

Where, Why, and More Importantly, How Much?, 985 PLI/PAT 271, 274 (2009).
46.
Id.; see Eric J. Goodman, A National Identity Crisis: The Need for a FederalRight of
Publicity Statute, 9 DEPAUL-LCA J. ART & ENT. L. 227, 254 (1999) (recognizing that the
commercial nature of an identity merely informs what value damages related to infringement of
the right will have).
47.
MCCARTHY, PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY, supra note 44, § 1:7.
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the rights involved were those of "famous plaintiffs," traditional
privacy doctrine failed to articulate adequately the concern at issue:
famous plaintiffs, by definition, make a living through the
commercialization of their identities and therefore do not suffer any
"mental trauma" over the public dissemination of those identities. 48
Instead, the concern for famous plaintiffs lay with controlling the
commercial use of identity and receiving adequate compensation for
its use. 49 Thus, in 1953, Judge Frank of the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals coined the term "right of publicity" to describe a new right
that protected all persons' commercial interests in the use of their
personalities independent of any privacy interests associated with
50
identity.
The Supreme Court expressly recognized the right of publicity
in 1977.51 In Zacchini v. Scripps-HowardBroadcastingCo., the Court
held that Hugo Zacchini's right of publicity had been infringed by a
news service that broadcast his entire human cannonball act without
his permission. 52 The Court noted that the interest protected by the
right of publicity was "closely analogous to the goals of patent and
copyright law, focusing on the right of the individual to reap the
reward of his endeavors and having little to do with protecting feelings
or reputation." 53 Thus, at least within the context of an individual's
performance, the Court recognized the distinction between the
economic interests behind the right of publicity and the privacy
54
protections motivating a right of privacy.
55
Today, the right of publicity is a "distinct legal category,"
56
clearly separable from any privacy interest related to identity.
Typically, courts classify the right of publicity as a type of intellectual
property right.51 However, it can simultaneously be properly viewed
as a "species within the genus of 'unfair competition' law."58 In
attempting to classify the right of publicity, commentators have
observed that "it is more accurate to think of [the right of publicity] as
48.
49.

Id.
Id.

50.

Haelan Labs., Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866, 868 (2d Cir. 1953); see

MCCARTHY, PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY, supranote 44, § 1:26.

53.
54.
55.

Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977).
Id. at 563, 575, 578.
Id. at 573.
Id. at 576-77.
MCCARTHY, PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY, supranote 44, § 1:3.

56.

5 J. THOMAS McCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION §

51.

52.

28:6 (4th ed. 2009) [MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION].
MCCARTHY, PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY, supranote 44, § 3:1.
57.

58.

Id.
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a sui generis mixture of personal rights, property rights, and rights
under the law of unfair competition than to attempt, Proscrustean-like
[sic], to fit it precisely into one of those categories." 59
The right of publicity originates exclusively from state
statutory or common law and has no federal counterpart. 60 Currently,
nineteen states have statutes that define a right of publicity, and
twenty-eight others recognize a common law right of publicity. 61 The
right of publicity is also recognized in the Restatement (Third) of
Unfair Competition Law. 62 Although right of publicity laws vary from
state to state, establishing a prima facie case of infringement typically
requires (1) the plaintiff to show that he possesses an enforceable
right in a human being; (2) that the defendant has, without
permission, used that persona such that the plaintiff is identifiable;
and (3) that the defendant's use was commercial. 63 There is no need to
prove falsity of any kind-any unauthorized use of a person's identity
to draw attention to a product or advertisement is sufficient to
infringe that person's right of publicity. 64
C. Interactionof The Right of Publicity and the CDA
Recently, courts have split as to whether state law intellectual
property claims are actionable against ICSPs under the CDA. 65
Generally, federal intellectual property laws preempt state law
intellectual property claims, rendering the actionability of the state

59.
Id. § 1:7 (citing Steven Hoffman, Limitations on the Right of Publicity, 28 BULL.
COPYRIGHT SOC'Y 111, 112 (1980)).
60.
Id. § 6:135; see Goodman, supra note 46, at 247-48 (recognizing that some celebrities
attempt to seek right of publicity claims under the Lanham Act § 43(a), but that the Act is poorly
suited to right of publicity claims as right of publicity and trademark are not completely
analogous).
61.
Right of Publicity, Statutes, http://rightofpublicity.comlstatutes (last visited Feb. 18,
2010).
62.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION §§ 46-49 (1995).
63.
See MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION, supra note 56, § 28:7;
Matthew Minora, Comment, Rumor Has It that Non-Celebrity Gossip Web Site Operators Are
Overestimating Their Immunity Under the Communications Decency Act, 17 COMMLAw
CONSPECTUS 821, 859-60 (2009) (distinguishing commercial use from "news" use that deserves
first amendment protection).
64.
McCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION, supra note 56, § 28:6; see
MCCARTHY, PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY, supranote 44, § 3:4.
65.
See Posting of David Johnson (Emerging Circuit Split: Does the Communications
Decency Act Shield State Law Claims for Misappropriationof Right of Publicity?) to Digital
Media Lawyer Blog, http://www.digitalmedialawyerblog.com/2009/03/emerging-circuit-split_
does th l.html (Mar. 27, 2009).
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law claim unimportant. 66 In some situations, however, where state
law grants some additional right or, like the right of publicity, where
there is no federal law counterpart at all, the actionability of state
intellectual property claims under the CDA remains relevant because
no preemption occurs.6 7 With respect to the right of publicity, claims
can be brought against ICSPs if the CDA's immunity exception covers
state and federal intellectual property law; however, if the CDA's
immunity exception covers only federal intellectual property law,
68
ICSPs remain immune from right of publicity claims.
In the Ninth Circuit, case law firmly establishes that the CDA
immunizes ICSPs from state law intellectual property claims. 69 In
2003, the Ninth Circuit held in Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc. that
an online matchmaking service was statutorily immune from claims
related to false content posted on the service by third parties. 70 Based
on the fact that historically immunity under the CDA had been
broadly construed, and citing Congress's intentions to preserve the
growth of the Internet, the court found that the dating service was
immune under the act from all the plaintiffs claims, including a claim
71
for misappropriation of the plaintiffs right of publicity.
More recently, the Ninth Circuit expressly held in Perfect 10,
Inc. v. CCBill, LLC that the CDA only abrogates ICSPs' immunity
with respect to federal intellectual property claims.7 2 In that case, the
court ruled that an entity that provided web-hosting and Internet
connectivity services to sites that posted stolen images was immune
under the CDA from any right of publicity claims.7 3 The court
supported its holding with policy reasoning, explaining that exposing
ICSPs to suits under various, non-uniform state intellectual property
claims would "be contrary to Congress's expressed goal of insulating
74
the development of the Internet from the various state-law regimes."

66.

See U.S. CONST. art. VI (conflicting or redundant state laws are preempted by

federal laws); see also Crow v. Wainwright, 720 F.2d 1224, 1225-26 (11th Cir. 1983) (commenting
that state copyright law is preempted unless it bestows some additional right).
67.
See U.S. CONST. art. VI; MCCARTHY, PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY, supra note 44, § 6:135.
68.
See Law Wire, supra note 19.
69.
See Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill LLC, 488 F.3d 1102, 1118-19 (9th Cir. 2007); Carafano
v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d 1119, 1119 (9th Cir. 2003).
70.
339 F.3d 1119.
71.
Id. at 1123-25. Although the court immunized the dating service from all claims
under the CDA, it did not specifically discuss the right of publicity claim within the context of the
intellectual property exception to Section 230 immunity. See id. at 1119-25.
72.
488 F.3d at 1119.
73.
Id. at 1118-19.
74.
Id. at 1118-19 ("States have any number of laws that could be characterized as
intellectual property laws: trademark, unfair competition, dilution, right of publicity and trade
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The court further noted that exposure to this type of liability could
"threaten the freedom of speech in the new and burgeoning Internet
medium."7 5 To avoid inflicting these consequences, the Ninth Circuit
interpreted the CDA as leaving ICSP immunity for state law
76
intellectual property infractions intact.
However, other courts have not immunized ICSPs from state
law right of publicity claims under the CDA. In Doe v. Friendfinder
Network, Inc., the District Court of New Hampshire held that the
operators of online adult personal websites that connected members
through online personal ads could be sued for infringement of the
right of publicity.7 71n ruling that immunity under the CDA does not
extend to either federal or state intellectual property claims, the court
focused on the language of the statute itself, which states that
immunity does not extend to "any law pertaining to intellectual
property."7 8 The court noted that, while federal and state law are
distinguished from one another in other parts of the statute, the
provision exempting intellectual property claims from immunity
makes no such distinction.7 9 The Friendfinder court rejected the
policy-based reasoning of the Ninth Circuit, arguing that "[t]his court
has no reason to believe that reading § 230(e)(2) to exempt state
intellectual property law would place any materially greater burden
on service providers than they face by having to comply with federal
80
intellectual property law."
Most recently, in Atlantic Recording Corp. v. Project Playlist,
Inc., the District Court for the Southern District of New York held
that an Internet website that provided an index of links to songs
available on third-party websites could be sued for state law copyright

defamation, to name just a few.... An entity otherwise entitled to § 230 immunity would thus be
forced to bear the costs of litigation under a wide variety of state statutes.").
75.
Id. at 1118 (quoting Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330 (4th Cir. 1997))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
76.
Id. at 1119.
77.
540 F. Supp. 2d. 288, 291-93. The holding was consistent with dicta from previous
circuit decisions and in line with other courts which assumed state law intellectual property
claims were excepted from CDA immunity. Id. at 298-99 (citing Universal Commc'n Sys., Inc. v.
Lycos, Inc., 478 F.3d 413, 422-25 (1st Cir. 2007) (stating in dicta that ICSPs are not immune
from state law intellectual property claims); see Almeida v. Amazon.com, Inc., 456 F.3d 1316,
1323-24 (11th Cir. 2006) (assuming state intellectual property claims are excepted from CDA
immunity); Gucci Am., Inc. v. Hall & Assocs., 135 F. Supp. 2d 409, 413 (S.D.N.Y. 2001)
(assuming state intellectual property claims are excepted from CDA immunity
78.
47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(2) (2006) (emphasis added).
79.
Friendfinder,540 F. Supp. 2d at 299-300 ("[W]here Congress wished to distinguish
between state and federal law in § 230, it knew how to do so.").
80.
Id. at 301.
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infringement claims under the CDA.81 The Project Playlist court also
rejected the Ninth Circuit's reasoning, arguing the reasoning in
'8 2
Perfect 10 "lack[ed] any support in the plain language of the CDA
and agreeing with the Friendfindercourt that "[b]ecause the language
of the CDA is clear, as 'any law' means both state and federal law, the
Court need not engage in an analysis of the CDA's legislative history
or purpose."8 3
This holding suggests an emerging circuit split
regarding the applicability of CDA immunity for ICSPs to state law
84
intellectual property claims.
II. ANALYZING THE CIRCUIT SPLIT: WHY ICSPs ARE LIABLE FOR STATE
LAW INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CLAIMS UNDER THE CDA
A. Resolving the Emerging Circuit Split
The Friendfinder and Project Playlist courts' position that
ICSPs are not immune from any intellectual property claims, even
those based in state law, is most persuasive based on the text of the
CDA. Because case law establishes that intellectual property is not a
static concept for the purposes of the CDA,8 5 holding ICSPs liable
under the Act for all types of intellectual property claims, even nontraditional claims such as the right of publicity, is most consistent
with both the text and purposes of the CDA.8 6 Therefore, based on the
current law, ICSPs should remain liable for right of publicity claims,
even if those claims arise from content generated by third-parties.
The immunity provision of the CDA does not suggest that
liability under the Act is limited to federal intellectual property law,
but instead reads that "[n]othing in this section shall be construed to
limit any law relating to intellectual property."8 7 The modifier, "any,"
is key. The Supreme Court has noted in other contexts that "any" is

81.
603 F. Supp. 2d 690, 692-93, 704 (S.D.N.Y. 2009); see 17 U.S.C. § 301(c) (2006)
(explaining that federal copyright law will not preempt state law for recordings fixed prior to
February 15, 1972); 603 F. Supp. 2d at 694 n.5 (noting that several songs on the website were
recorded prior to February 15, 1972).
82.
Project Playlist, 603 F. Supp. 2d at 703; see Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill LLC, 488 F.3d
1102, 1118-19 (9th Cir. 2007).
83.
603 F. Supp. 2d at 704.
84.
See Johnson, supra note 65.
85.
See Gucci Am., Inc. v. Hall & Assocs., 135 F. Supp. 2d 409, 414 (S.D.N.Y. 2001)
("[N]owhere does Section 230 state that the laws to which it refers . . . are limited to the
intellectual property laws as they existed [when enacted].").
86.
See generally Project Playlist, 603 F. Supp. 2d at 702-04; Doe v. Friendfinder
Network, Inc., 540 F. Supp. 2d 288, 298-302 (D.N.H. 2008).
87.
Id.; see Friendfinder,540 F. Supp. 2d at 299.
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"expansive language [that] offers no indication whatever that
Congress intended [a] limiting construction."8 8 "Any" law pertaining
to intellectual property is thus properly construed to include both
89
federal and state laws.
Furthermore, the position that ICSPs remain liable for state
law intellectual property claims is consistent with the language of the
To limit the immunity exception to federal
CDA as a whole.
intellectual property laws, the Ninth Circuit must imply the word
"federal" to modify intellectual property in § 230(c)(2) of the CDA-the
provision itself makes no explicit distinction.9 0 However, throughout
the CDA, Congress explicitly distinguishes federal law from state law
when it sees fit to do so. 91 For example, 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(1) reads:
"Nothing in this section shall be construed to impair the enforcement
of [named federal criminal statutes] or any other Federal criminal
statute."92 Further, 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(3) reads: "Nothing in this
section shall be construed to prevent any State from enforcing any
State law that is consistent with this section." 93 Since Congress
distinguishes federal from state law elsewhere in the CDA, the lack of
any qualifying label in § 230(e)(2) indicates that Congress did not
intend to differentiate between state and federal intellectual property
94
law, and ICSP immunity does not extend to either type of violation.
When the language of the statute is unambiguous, as it is here,
further inquiry into legislative history or public policy is
Friendfinder,540 F. Supp. 2d at 299 (quoting Harrison v. PPG Indus., Inc., 446 U.S.
88.
578, 589 (1980)) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted); see Ali v. Fed.
Bureau of Prisons, 552 U.S. 214, 217-21 (2008) (reasoning that the phrase "any other law
enforcement officer" in 28 U.S.C. § 2680(c) of the Federal Torts Claim Act "suggests a broad
meaning"); see also Project Playlist, 603 F. Supp. 2d at 703-04 (citing United States v. Gonzales,
520 U.S. 1, 5 (1997) for its "holding that 'any other term of imprisonment' includes both state and
federal terms of imprisonment")); ACLU v. Dep't of Def., 543 F.3d 59, 69 (2d Cir. 2008) (holding
that the word "any" in statute "deserves an expansive application where the surrounding
statutory language and other relevant legislative context support it").
89.
Id.
90.
See Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill LLC, 488 F.3d 1102, 1118-19 (9th Cir. 2007); Carafano
v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d 1119, 1122 (9th Cir. 2003).
91.
Friendfinder,540 F. Supp. 2d at 299-300.
92.
See 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(1) (emphasis added).
93.
Id. § 230(e)(3) (emphasis added). In fact, the statement that "State law[s] that [are]
consistent with this section" remain valid claims against ICSPs indicates that state intellectual
property laws must be enforced against ICSPs. See id.
94.
Friendfinder,540 F. Supp. 2d at 300 ("[Tlhe use of 'any' in § 230(e)(2), in contrast to
the use of 'federal' elsewhere in the CDA, suggests that Congress did not intend the terms to be
is a
read interchangeably."); see also Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U.S. 438, 452 (2002) ("[I]t
general principle of statutory construction that when 'Congress includes particular language in
one section of a statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed
that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion."') (quoting
Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983)).
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unnecessary. 95 Thus, the Ninth Circuit's reliance on the history and
purposes of the CDA to immunize ICSPs from state law claims is
inappropriate. 96 However, even an analysis of the purposes of the
CDA does not necessarily suggest that ICSPs should remain immune
from state intellectual property claims. Although the CDA indicates a
desire to preserve the Internet as free from "government regulation,"
it makes no distinction between federal and state governments that
justifies immunizing ICSPs from state intellectual property claims
while exposing them to federal intellectual property claims. 97 In fact,
the CDA expressly reiterates that it seeks to preserve an Internet free
from "Federal or State regulation."98 Thus, the stated purposes of the
Act do not support distinguishing between federal and state
intellectual property law within the context of § 230(e)(2).
Consequently, neither the language of the CDA nor the purposes of
the Act indicate that ICSPs should be immune from state law
intellectual property claims, and the Friendfinderand Project Playlist
courts have correctly interpreted the statute.
B. Implications of State Intellectual Property Liability for ICSPs and
the Right of Publicity
Although a major motivation behind the Ninth Circuit's
holding that ICSPs should remain immune from state intellectual
property claims was the consequences of inconsistent state intellectual
property regimes, 99 commentators tend to agree that "[i]n general,
federal and state trademark and unfair competition law can coexist
and cooperate without conflict" 100 because "[iun most states, courts
have held that the state trademark common law and statutes on
trademark law are to be given the same meaning and interpretation
as the mainstream principles of common law and federal trademark
law." 10 1
Furthermore, federal law generally preempts state
intellectual property law as long as the state law does not create some

95.
96.
not free to
and intent
97.
98.
99.

United States v. Ron Pair Enters., 489 U.S. 235, 241 (1989).
Ruiz v. Bally Total Fitness Holding Corp, 496 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2007) ("Courts are
disregard the plain language of a statute and, instead, conjure up legislative purposes
out of thin air.").
47 U.S.C. § 230(a)(4) (2006); Friendfinder,540 F. Supp. 2d at 300.
47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(2) (2006) (emphasis added).
See Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d 1119, 1124 (9th Cir. 2003).

100.

MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION, supra note 56, § 22:2.

101.

Id. § 22:1.
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unique or greater enforceable right.102 Thus, although state law
intellectual property law can and does differ from federal intellectual
property law in some respects, it is certainly logical, in most instances,
to conclude that there is "no reason to believe that reading § 230(e)(2)
to exempt state intellectual property law would place any materially
greater burden on service providers than they face by having to
10 3
comply with federal intellectual property law."
However, because the right of publicity does not have a federal
counterpart,10 4 and thus creates additional rights not subject to
preemption, 105 enforcing the right of publicity against ICSPs would
create a new, additional burden on the sites. Unfortunately for ICSPs,
attempting to meet this burden by complying with each state's right of
publicity regime is not an easy task, since rights of publicity are
currently "controlled by the vastly differing statutory and case law of
the fifty states."'0 6 In some jurisdictions, the right is applicable only
to celebrities; in others, it applies to all individuals. 0 7 In some
jurisdictions, an individual may only invoke the right of publicity if
that individual has previously commercially exploited his or her
identity.108 State laws also differ as to whether the right of publicity
exists after an individual dies, and if so how long that right lasts. 10 9
Furthermore, the available defenses in right of publicity cases vary by
jurisdiction.110
These differences mean that holding ICSPs liable for state law
right of publicity claims would expose ICSPs to non-uniform,
Additionally, the fact that
unpredictable legal requirements."'
Internet sites are viewable across the country exposes ICSPs to the

102.
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2; see also Crow v. Wainwright, 720 F.2d 1224, 1225-26 (11th
Cir. 1983) (commenting that state copyright law is preempted unless it bestows some additional
right).
103.
Friendfinder,540 F. Supp. 2d at 301.
104.
MCCARTHY, PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY, supra note 44, § 6:135.
105.
See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
106.
INT'L TRADEMARK ASS'N, FEDERAL RIGHT OF PUBLICITY: REQUEST FOR ACTION BY THE
INTA BOARD OF DIRECTORS (1998), availableat http://www.inta.org/index.php?option=comcontent&task-view&id=285&Itemid=153&getcontent=3.
107.
Publishing Law Center, Right of Publicity, http://www.publaw.comlrightpriv.html
(last visited Feb. 18, 2010).
108.
Id.
109.
Id.; INT'L TRADEMARK ASS'N, supranote 106 ("Whether the right of publicity survives
after the death of the holder has been a point of sharp division among the various states.").
110.
INT'L TRADEMARK ASS'N, supra note 106.
Id. (stating that there is a need for uniformity and predictability in right of publicity
111.
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laws of multiple jurisdictions, creating increased risk for these sites. 112
Consequently, within the right of publicity context, the Ninth Circuit's
concern of intellectual property liability having a "chilling effect" on
3
ICSPs is not completely unfounded."
Particularly within the context of social networking sites,
exposure to right of publicity claims poses a genuine liability
concern. 1 4 Arguably, a right of publicity claim could be made against
social networking ICSPs for unauthorized profiles, threatening the
very heart of the service these sites provide. 115 Note that the accounts
on social networking sites are used commercially-social networking
sites generate income by renting advertising space to companies, and
that advertising space becomes more valuable as more users visit the
site. 1 6 Thus, profiles on social networks, particularly celebrity
profiles that attract more viewers and web traffic, are used
If an account is
commercially by social networking ICSPs.1 7
unauthorized and the individual is identifiable based on the aspects of
persona or identity used, a prima facie right of publicity claim can be
8
established."

112.
See Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill LLC, 488 F.3d 1102, 1118-19 (9th Cir. 2007). Personal
jurisdiction minimum contacts analysis in the context of Internet defendants is still an open
question. See Eric C. Hawkins, Note, General Jurisdiction and Internet Contacts: What Role, If
Any, Should the Zippo Sliding Scale Test Play in the Analysis?, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 2371, 2385412 (2006).
Id.
113.
See Law Wire, supra note 19 ("This conclusion, if adopted by other courts, could give
114.
a boost to the viability of a range of state law claims related to intellectual property-such as
common law misappropriation, right of publicity, and state or common-law trademark law
claims-brought against the operators of various online services.").
115.
See supra Part I.B.
116.
See Matthew D. Hemmer, Note, Keeping Your Name and Images Private-How
Existing Property Law and Requests for Removal Could Stop Unauthorized Display of Your
Identity Online, 34 N. KY. L. REV. 723, 740-41 (2007).
117.
See id.
118.
See MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION, supra note 56, § 28:7;
Minora, supra note 63, at 860. In addition to liability concerns raised by the social profiles
themselves, which is the focus of this Note, other potential right of publicity claims exist against
social networking ICSPs for particular services offered as part of the networking site. For
example, unauthorized photos of individuals may give rise to right of publicity claims against the
ICSP. Hemmer, supra note 116, at 743-45. Furthermore, some authors have identified, at least
in the non-celebrity context, potential right of publicity liability for online gossip sites. E.g.,
Minora, supra note 63, at 860-61. Finally, targeted social marketing, where ads may indicate
that a user endorses certain products, may implicate the right of publicity. William McGeveran,
Disclosure, Endorsement, and Identity in Social Marketing, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 1105, 1117-22,
1149-52 (2009).
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III. RESPONSES TO SOCIAL NETWORKING ICSPs POTENTIAL RIGHT OF
PUBLICITY LIABILITY

A. Self-Protection by ICSPs
If ICSPs are not statutorily immune from state right of
publicity claims, they may be able to protect themselves from liability
through the development of self-regulating strategies. This response
to the Friendfinder and Project Playlist readings of Section 230 is
consistent with the CDA because the development of self-regulating
strategies and technologies by ICSPs is one of the Act's stated
congressional purposes. 119
ICSPs likely possess the ability to self-regulate and protect
themselves from liability. Although Congress established ICSP
immunity in the CDA because it feared that liability for third-party
content might chill the growth of the nascent Internet by making it too
risky for ICSPs to continue hosting sites, 120 the position of the Internet
and third-party content generated sites is not as delicate today as it
was when Congress enacted the CDA in 1996. Over the past thirteen
years, the Internet has progressed from an emerging technology to an
integral part of everyday life. This status change indicates that the
Internet and its discussion forums are no longer an infant industry
requiring statutory protection to grow and function. At the same time
that the ubiquitous nature of social networking media presents a large
potential liability concern for ICSPs, the fact that these sites have
become seemingly indispensible gives ICSPs bargaining power they
can use to protect themselves by attempting to contract away some
12 1
liability as a condition of use.
One model for how social networking sites may avoid liability
for right of publicity claims is to use the methods that ICSPs have
implemented to attempt to limit liability for federal intellectual
property right claims. 122
Most social networking ICSPs take
advantage of user-policing to monitor copyright and other intellectual
property activity by creating "Notice and Take Down" systems under
119.
47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(3)-(4) (2006); see Zeran v Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 331 (4th
Cir. 1997) ("Congress enacted § 230 to remove the disincentives to self-regulation.").
120.
Zeran, 129 F.3d at 331.
121.
For example, terms of use for social networking sites can include clauses that waive
the user's right of publicity. See Citizen Media Law Project, Using the Name and Likeness of
Another, http://www.citmedialaw.org/legal-guide/using-name-or-likeness-another
(last visited
March 3, 2010). Sites could also require users to agree that they will not post material that
would infringe other party's rights, so that the site has the possibility of recovering on the
contract in the event they are sued. Id.
122.
See 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(2).
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which users can report infringing content that the ICSP can
investigate and remove. 123 These strategies are largely a response to
the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA), which provides safe
harbor for ICSPs that respond to reports of copyright violations and
promptly remove infringing material from their sites. 124 Although the
DMCA safe harbor provision applies only to copyright infringement,
ICSPs have adopted similar notice and take down strategies for other
types of intellectual property in an attempt to limit potential
liability.125
With respect to the right of publicity specifically, Twitter has
recently taken steps to protect itself from liability by updating and
expanding its terms of service.1 26 The new terms of service clearly
state, "You may not impersonate others through the Twitter service in
a manner that does or is intended to mislead, confuse, or deceive
others." 127 The recently added "Verified Accounts" program for
individual pages complements this stronger stance against
impersonation. 128 The Verified Account badge indicates that Twitter
has investigated whether or not the account is "approved" by the
Twitter currently verifies
individual it claims to represent.129
well-known artists,
example,
"[flor
users,
famous
by
accounts only

See, e.g., Facebook, Facebook Copyright Policy, http://www.facebook.com/lega1
123.
copyright.php (last visited Feb. 18, 2010); Google, Infringement Notification for Google Blogger,
http://www.google.comfblogger dmca.html (last visited Feb. 18, 2010); Twitter, Filing a
Copyright Complaint or DMCA Take-Down Notice, http:/Ihelp.twitter.com/forums/26257/
entries!15795 (last visited Feb. 18, 2010); YouTube, Copyright Infringement Notification,
http://www.youtube.com/t/dmca-policy (last visited Feb. 18, 2010). ICSPs are also experimenting
with "fingerprinting" technology that will assist in identifying infringing material. See Kenneth
Li & Eric Auchard, Youtube to Test Video ID with Time Warner, Disney, REUTERS, June 12, 2007,
available at http://www.reuters.com/article/technologyNews/idUSWEN871820070612.
Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, § 202(c), 112 Stat. 2877,
124.
2879-81 (1998) (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 512(c) (2006)); H.R. REP. No. 105-551, pt. 2,
at 52-62 (1998) (describing DMCA's take down and put back procedures).
(VeRO),
Property Infringements
See e.g., eBay, Reporting Intellectual
125.
http://pages.ebay.com/help/tp/vero-rights-owner.html (last visited Feb. 18, 2010) (describing
notice and takedown procedures for all intellectual property infringements modeled on the
DMCA); Facebook, supra note 123 (follow "What should I do if someone is pretending to be me?"
hyperlink) (describing notice and takedown procedures for non-copyright intellectual property
infringement and for "impersonation").
See Posting of Ben Parr (Twitter Changes TOS, Opens the Door for Ads) to Mashable:
126.
The Social Media Guide, http://mashable.com/2009/09/10/twitter-tos/ (Sept. 10, 2009, 16:48:41
EST).
Twitter, The Twitter Rules, http://twitter.zendesk.com/forums126257/entries/18311
127.
(last visited Feb. 18, 2010).
See Twitter, Verified Account, http://twitter.comlhelp/verified (last visited Feb. 18,
128.
2010).
Id.
129.
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athletes, actors, public officials, and public agencies."'13 0 This strategy
is well tailored to combat the unauthorized accounts most likely to
give rise to right of publicity claims and thereby limits Twitter's
exposure to liability.
B. CongressionalResponse
Although social networking sites like Twitter have the
potential ability to self-regulate and proactively prevent right of
publicity claims, these strategies are costly. 131
Formerly, only
celebrities were likely to assert right of publicity claims, but the
growth of reality television and today's media environment of instant
celebrity results in "a much broader class of people who may assert
their own rights to publicity,"'132 enlarging the practical scope of
potential liability and the corresponding cost to prevent it. This cost is
a genuine concern--despite the fact that advertisement has helped
social networking sites raise revenue, the profitability of these sites
still lags significantly behind their popularity, 133 meaning that
adverse judgments or settlements across the millions of site
subscribers pose a significant threat to ICSPs. Furthermore, the
much-used notice and takedown strategies are far from perfectalthough they definitively create a defense to copyright infringement
claims in many circumstances, the law is less clear as to whether
attempted detection and prompt removal can defeat other kinds of
intellectual property claims. 34 In light of the basic monitoring costs of
self regulation, potential costs of lawsuits or settlements, and the
reality that monitoring only creates an imperfect defense to many

130.
Id. See also Posting of Logan Westbrook (Twitter to Crack Down on Fakers) to The
Escapist, http://www.escapistmagazine.com/news/view/94850-Twitter-to-Crack-Down.on-Fakers
(September 20, 2009, 10:34 EST).
131.
See Twitter, supra note 128 ("[B]ecause of the cost and time required, [Twitter is]
only testing this feature with a small set of folks for the time being.").
132.
Hemmer, supra note 116, at 740.
133.
Nick Clark, Facebook Heads Toward Profit, INDEP., Sept. 17, 2009, at 42, available
at
http://www.independent.co.uknewslbusinessnews/facebook-heads-towards-profit1788430.html ("Nigel Gwilliam, head of digital at the Institute of Practitioners in Advertisers,
said: 'To not be haemorrhaging money is an achievement, but not one that signals wild
profitability.... Many consider the real value of websites like Facebook lies not in advertising
but in engagement and participation. But no one has cracked the business model for this yet.' ").

134.

See Digital Media Lawyer Blog, Tiffany v. eBay: eBay's Notice and Takedown System

and Trademark,http://www.digitalmedialawyerblog.com/2009/08/tiffany-v-ebay-ebays-noticean.html (Aug. 14, 2009) (discussing whether eBay's notice and take down form creates a valid
defense to contributory trademark infringement); see generally 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2006) (stating
that the Act only applies to copyright infringement, and noting that it is not shelter ICSPs who
otherwise meet the requirements for vicarious liability).

2010]

SOCIAL NETWORKING AND THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY

631

claims, congressional action to grant ICSPs some sort of immunity for
right of publicity suits is desirable to avoid "unbridled actions
asserting violations of the rights of publicity [that] may chill internet
speech, or require unmanageable monitoring of every third party
135
contributor to a website."'
1. Establish Immunity for Right of Publicity Claims
Although the right of publicity is widely accepted as a type of
intellectual property claim, 136 the justifications for protecting publicity
rights distinguish them from other intellectual property rights.
Unlike the intellectual property rights of copyright or patent, the right
of publicity protects an inherent right, and does not incentivize the
creation of some new intellectual property. 137 Because the CDA seeks
to promote the creation of new ideas and expression by encouraging
the growth of the Internet as a forum for idea exchange, 138 leaving
ICSPs liable for right of publicity claims is inconsistent with the
underlying purposes of the CDA.
The scope of ICSP immunity in the CDA reflects a
congressional judgment regarding what rights and values should be
most protected by the statutory regime, creating a hierarchy of values
related to intellectual property rights and freedom of expression. 139
By immunizing ICSPs from suits related to defamation-type wrongs
arising out of third-party postings, Congress effectively states that it
values the promotion of free speech and idea exchange through the
development of an unfettered Internet more highly than it values
individual reputation. 140 Similarly, by revoking ICSP immunity for
intellectual property claims, Congress effectively states that the rights
guaranteed by intellectual property law are even more valuable than
the development of the Internet as a forum for First Amendment
expression. 4 1 The interaction of these interests within the CDA
reflects a general purpose behind the Act to promote the development
of the Internet, but not at the expense of intellectual property rights.
This congressional goal demonstrates a desire to promote (through the

Hemmer, supranote 116, at 746.
135.
See MCCARTHY, PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY, supra note 44, § 3:1.
136.
See id. at § 1:7.
137.
See 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(1)-(2) (2006).
138.
See Zeran v Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330-31 (4th Cir. 1997) (discussing
139.
congressional "policy choices" designing ICSP immunity).
See id.
140.
See id.
141.
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growth of the Internet) and incentivize (by leaving intellectual
property protection intact) creativity and idea exchange. 142
Applying this purpose to the scope of ICSP intellectual
property liability reveals that, unlike traditional intellectual property
rights, maintaining ICSP liability for right of publicity infringement is
inconsistent with the overarching purpose of the CDA. 143 First, the
justification for the limited monopoly created by copyright is that it
will "stimulate artistic creativity for the general public good" by
allowing the artist to "secure a fair return" on his investment. 44
Similarly, the limited monopoly created by a patent exists not merely
to "[create] private fortunes for the owners of the patents, but as a tool
to "promote the progress of science and the useful arts."'145 Based on
these rationales, leaving ICSPs liable for violations of patent and
copyright law under the CDA complements the Act's overall schemelike the "continued development of the Internet and other interactive
computer services,"1 46 these rights both promote the creation of new
ideas for the public good. 14 7 Alternatively, it would make little sense
to develop the Internet as a forum for the exchange of ideas, and then
insulate ICSPs from liability such that there is no available recourse if
those intellectual property rights are infringed by anonymous site
users. By leaving ICSPs on the hook for copyright and patent
infringement, the CDA avoids this anomalous result.
Unlike copyright or patent law, the consistency of extending
ICSP liability to the right of publicity with the goals of the CDA is
questionable. The theoretical justifications for recognizing the right of
publicity are multi-faceted and diverse, even "border[ing] on
incoherence."'' 48 One popular justification is that the right to one's
identity is a self-evident, natural property right, and it just seems fair
that an individual should control and financially profit from the use of
his or her identity. 49 A second popular argument for recognizing the
right of publicity, called the "economic justification," states that
granting a property right in a person's identity provides the best way
142.
See 47 U.S.C. §§ 230(b)(1), (e)(2) (stating that the policy of CDA is "to promote the
continued development of the Internet" and that the law has no effect on intellectual property
claims).
143.
See supraPart III.B.1.
144.
Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975).
145.
Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 511 (1917)
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
146.
47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(1)-(2) (stating a desire for "unfettered" Internet growth).

147.
See id. § 230(a)(3)-(4) (commenting on the development of the Internet as a place for
discourse to the benefit to all Americans).
148.
McGeveran, supra note 118, at 1132.
149.
MCCARTHY, PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY, supra note 44, §§ 2:1-2:3.
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to create a market for that identity and ensure efficient commercial
use of that name and likeness. 150 In other words, the right of publicity
privatizes an otherwise public good, giving rise to an efficient market
in which the individuals who value identities most highly will buy
A final common justification for
them for commercial use. 151
recognizing the right of publicity is the incentive justification, which
to
states that people view the value of their identity as an incentive 152
enter the public eye and subsequently profit from their identities.
Under this theory, the incentives created by the right of publicity are
analogous to those of patents or copyrights-the right of publicity
creates a "monopoly" over identity that incentivizes the creation of a
153
profitable persona.
Considering the right of publicity within the context of social
networking sites reveals logical shortcomings in these justifications
for the right. For example, although the economic justification for the
right of publicity is readily applicable to traditional commercial uses of
identity, where advertisers use celebrity endorsements to advertise
products, the justification breaks down in the context of social
networking sites. Unlike traditional advertising, where commercial
gain accrues due to specific celebrity endorsement, commercial gain
for social networking sites occurs through increased site traffic and
or
for advertising
increased potential
corresponding
the
subscribership. 154 Because social networking ICSPs are not buying
celebrity endorsements, but merely profiting from the public's desire
to view a particular profile, they are not participating in a market for
the use of the celebrity's identity. Barring the development of some
sort of exclusive user contract, where celebrities are limited to or
receive benefits for the exclusive use of one social networking service,
there is no relevant market for identity within the context of social
networking for the right of publicity to facilitate. Consequently, no
allocative efficiency can be achieved by attaching intellectual property
rights to identity.
Furthermore, outside of the performance context, some circuit
courts have expressed doubt regarding the validity of the incentive
justification for the right of publicity. 155 They point out that "most
150.

Id. § 2:7.

151.
152.
153.

Id.
Id. § 2:6.
Id.

154. See supra Part II.B.
See C.B.C. Distribution & Mktg., Inc. v. Major League Baseball Advanced Media,
155.
L.P., 505 F.3d 818, 824 (8th Cir. 2007); Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n,
95 F.3d 959, 974 (10th Cir. 1996); see also Right of Publicity, Brief History of RoP,
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celebrities with valuable commercial identities are already
handsomely compensated," making any extra incentive offered by a
right of publicity marginal at best.1 56 Intuitively, it seems fair to
assert that people rarely seek prominence in a field for the
independent commercial value that achievement adds to identity. 157
Additionally, the incentive rationale is further strained due to the fact
that the right of publicity is an inherent right that applies to all
individuals, even those who have not achieved prominence or celebrity
status. 15 When considering the right of publicity as a non-celebrity,
inherent right, "the 'incentive rationale' has little if any weight in
support of the existence of the right."'159 Consequently, the incentive
justification is better understood not as an argument that the right of
publicity independently incentivizes achievement such that identity
gains commercial value, but instead as an assertion that the right of
publicity protects against any offsetting disincentives that potential
misuse of that identity may create once prominence is achieved. 160
Given these justifications for the right of publicity, leaving
ICSPs liable for right of publicity infringement under the CDA is
inconsistent with the values hierarchy established by the Act and with
its underlying policy.
Unlike copyright or patent law-which
encourage creation of new ideas to benefit the public at large-the
right of publicity is more concerned with protecting an inherent right.
While traditional intellectual property rights foster and reward
innovation and invention, 16 1 nothing need be created to take
advantage of the inherent right of publicity.162
Consequently,
enforcing this right against ICSPs does not contribute to a legal
atmosphere that incentivizes progress and creation to "promote the
continued development of the Internet"' 63 as a forum for "true
diversity of political discourse, unique opportunities for cultural

http://rightofpublicity.com/brief-history-of-rop (last visited Feb. 18, 2010) (discussing the right of
publicity's position within the intellectual property family).
156.
Cardtoons,95 F.3d at 974.
157.
See Cardtoons, 95 F.3d at 973 ('The incentive effect of publicity rights, however, has
been overstated. Most sports and entertainment celebrities with commercially valuable identities
engage in activities that themselves generate a significant amount of income; the commercial
value of their identities is merely a by-product of their performance values.").
158.

McCARTHY, PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY, supra note 44, § 1:3.

159.
160.
161.

Id. § 2:6.
See id.
Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257, 262 (1979).

162.

See MCCARTHY, PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY, supra note 44, § 1:3.

163.
growth).

47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(1)-(2) (2006) (stating congressional desire for "unfettered" Internet
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164
development, and myriad avenues for intellectual activity."
Therefore, to remain consistent with the overall Act, Congress should
immunize ICSPs from right of publicity claims.
Using the protective focus of the right of publicity to justify
treating it differently from other intellectual property rights under the
CDA's immunity provision suggest that trademark rights should
receive the same treatment. The protective aspects of the right of
publicity are analogous to those of trademark. 161 Just as the right of
publicity secures to an individual the value of the use of his or her
identity, 166 trademark "secur[es] to a mark's owner the goodwill of his
business."1 67 Additionally, like the right of publicity protects against
1 68
consumer confusion by limiting unauthorized endorsements,
trademark protection limits consumer confusion by allowing the public
to be "confident that, in purchasing a product bearing a particular
trade-mark which it favorably knows, it will get the product which it
asks for and wants to get."1 69 Like the right of publicity, and in
contrast to patent or copyright, trademark has a primarily protective,
These similarities suggest that enforcing
not creative, focus. 1 70
trademark claims against ICSPs, like enforcing right of publicity
claims against ICSPs, is inconsistent with policies underlying the
CDA and that immunity from trademark infringement claims should
also be granted to them.
However, trademark is distinguishable from the right of
publicity in ways that may counsel against extending immunity for
trademark infringement claims to ICSPs. Unlike trademark, the right
of publicity is inherent in people-each person, simply by virtue of
being born, possess a right of publicity. 17 1 Alternatively, a trademark
attaches to "any word, name, symbol or device used by a manufacturer
or merchant to identify his goods and distinguish them from those

Id. § 230(a)(3).
See MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION, supra note 56, § 2:2
(identifying the twin goals of trademark law); MCCARTHY, PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY, supra note
44, § 2 (identifying the policy justifications for the right of publicity).
164.

165.

166.

Id. § 1:7.

167.
Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 763 (1992).
See MCCARTHY, PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY, supra note 44, § 2:8 (noting, however, that
168.
falsity is not required for a right of publicity infringement, and that falsity therefore does not
mark the outer limits of the right).
169.
Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 782 (Stevens, J., concurring).
170.
McCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION, supra note 56, § 6:3 (remarking
that the policy behind trademark is "protection of identifying symbols" not "encourag[ing]
invention").
171.
See MCCARTHY, PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY, supra note 44, § 1:3.
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manufactured by others."172 Because trademarks protect goods and
services, which must be created, trademark protection can be said to
provide at least some secondary incentives for creative development
and new ideas. 173 The distinction between an inherent right in people
and a right that attaches to goods makes the existence of secondary
creation incentives in the trademark context more credible. Although
people were also created at some point, it is hard to accept the
argument that parents "create" children because those children will
possess an enforceable identity right. Because of this distinction, it
may be appropriate to enforce trademark claims against ICSPs to the
extent that the enforcement of such creates secondary incentives to
develop products. Regardless of how trademarks are treating under
the statutory scheme, ICSPs should be granted immunity from
inherent, protection-focused right of publicity claims because enforcing
such rights does nothing the further the underlying idea-creating
purposes of the CDA.
As an alternative to completely immunizing ICSPs from right
of publicity liability, Congress could amend the DMCA, which
currently applies only to copyright law, to also provide safe-harbor for
right of publicity claims.
Although this solution does not offer
complete protection to ICSPs, it would make notice and takedown
programs, like the one adopted by Twitter, more reliable defenses
against the monetary damages associated with right of publicity
claims and mitigate the chilling effects that concern the Ninth Circuit.
This response would also be consistent with the other goals of the
CDA because it encourages the development of self-regulating
strategies by ICSPs. 174 A DMCA-like provision for right of publicity
claims would promote social networking sites' self-regulation efforts
by offering them a more reliable defense if they comply with the
75
regulatory provisions of the statute.
2. Adoption of a Federal Right of Publicity
Instead of offering full or conditioned immunity to ICSPs for
right of publicity claims, Congress could respond to the liability issue

172.
MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION, supra note 56, § 3:4 (quoting
Lanham Act, Pub. L. No. 109-312, § 45, 120 Stat. 1730, 1733 (2006) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §
1127)) (internal quotation omitted).
173.
Deborah R. Gerhardt, Consumer Investment in Trademark, 88 N.C. L. REV. 427, 447
(2010) (stating that trademark protection incentivizes the production of high quality products).
174.
See id. § 230(b)(3)-(4).
175.
See 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2006) (noting that safe harbor compliance is optional and only
available is an ICSP chooses to comply with the statute).
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by adopting a federal right of publicity that would expressly preempt
state law. One of the greatest concerns with holding ICSPs liable for
right of publicity violations is that the right of publicity is governed by
the diverse statutes and common law of the states. 176 Because right of
publicity laws are so fractured, it is more difficult and expensive for
businesses, particularly ICSPs which host sites accessible across the
177
entire country, to adopt a strategy that effectively limits liability.
By adopting a federal right of publicity to preempt inconsistent state
laws, Congress could facilitate ICSP compliance with right of publicity
laws without changing the broad intellectual property liability of
ICSPs under the CDA.
Congress has the authority to regulate the right of publicity,
which protects the commercial use of identity, under the Commerce
Clause. 178 Although Congress would not have exclusive authority to
regulate the right of publicity, it is highly likely that state and federal
right of publicity law, like trademark and unfair competition law,
could coexist without conflict. 179 Furthermore, the federal right of
publicity could serve as a model law for the states, and, even if states
don't adopt explicitly conforming legislation, the federal statute could
guide state courts interpreting state right of publicity laws.1 80 The
federal standard would thus dramatically encourage the development
of uniform right of publicity law, lowering the costs of compliance for
ICSPs. 18 1
Establishing a uniform federal right of publicity to harmonize
fragmented state laws is not a new idea.18 2 In 1994, the International
Trademark Association (INTA) formed a subcommittee to review the
status of the right of publicity.1 8 3 In particular, the INTA pushed to
add a federal right of publicity to the Lanham Act, the federal
trademark statute, in order to harmonize and explicitly preempt state
law. 184 The INTA recommended that the adopted law create a
descendible, transferable right of publicity for a specific time period
after a person's death.18 5 Finally, the group proposed a fair use
176.
See supraPart II.B.
177.
See id.
178.
See Sean D. Whaley, I'm a Highway Star: An Outline for a FederalRight of Publicity,
31 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 257, 266 (2009).
179.
McCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION, supra note 56, § 22:2.
180.
See Whaley, supranote 178, at 266.
181.
See id. at 266-67.
182.
See generally Goodman, supra note 46.
183.

INT'L TRADEMARK ASS'N, supra note 106.

184.
Id.; see also Lanham Act, Pub. L. No. 79-489, 60 Stat. 427 (1946) (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1129, 1141-1142 (2006)).
185.

INT'L TRADEMARK ASS'N, supra note 106.
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exception for uses such as "news, biography, history, fiction,
18 6
commentary[,] and parody."
Although the particular proposal by the INTA was criticized
and ultimately not adopted,18 7 the proposal addressed the main
harmonization issues that proponents of a federal right of publicity
consider
important:
duration,
transferability,
descendibility,
registration, and fair use.1 88 Any proposed federal right of publicity
should carefully consider the implications and incentives created by
the proposal's approach to each of these aspects of the right.
Harmonization of the conflicts in state right of publicity law would
result in a workable, uniform federal right of publicity statute. This
standard right, by preempting and informing the interpretation of
state laws, would facilitate the emergence of a more reliable
compliance standard for ICSPs in the event that they were held liable
for all intellectual property claims, even the state-law-based right of
publicity, under the CDA.
IV. CONCLUSION

The language and purposes of the CDA support the position
taken by some district courts that ICSPs are not immune from
liability under the CDA for either federal or state intellectual property
claims. The resulting exposure to right of publicity liability is
threatening for ICSPs that run the social networking sites that are
quickly becoming a ubiquitous part of popular culture.
The
uncertainty of right of publicity liability under existing state law and
the resulting costs associated with self-regulation both indicate that
congressional action should be taken to insulate ICSPs from right of
publicity liability.
To justify immunity for right of publicity claims under the
existing statutory scheme, this Note distinguishes the right of
publicity from other intellectual property claims by focusing on its
inherent nature and protective focus. Given the distinction made
between incentivizing creation, which makes continuing copyright and
patent liability consistent with the goals of the CDA, and mere
protection, these arguments could be extended to the area of
trademark as an intellectual property right. Future research could
186.

Id.

187.
Goodman, supra note 46, at 249-50 (commenting that incorporating a federal right of
publicity through the Lanham Act would be bad in that the right would only apply to
"celebrities" the way that the Lanham Act covers "famous" marks, and the right of publicity must
be for all people).
188.
Id. at 250-251.
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focus on the relationship between the incentives underlying
trademark protection and the CDA, and if these incentives are truly
consistent with legal atmosphere created by the Act.
With respect to the right of publicity, the CDA's immunity
carve-out will be more consistent with the Act's heirachy of values if
ICSPs are immune from right of publicity claims. To achieve this,
Congress should amend the CDA to shield ICSPs from right of
publicity claims, or at a minimum institute a safe harbor provision,
analogous to the DMCA, which would insulate ICSPs from liability by
providing a reliable defense if they are sued for right of publicity
infringement. Alternatively, Congress could adopt a uniform federal
right of publicity statute that would make self-protection against right
of publicity claims by ICSPs a more predictable and cost-effective
response to liability.
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